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HOMER NEAIJ, Petitioller, v. THE STATE OF CALIFOHNIAet al., He:;poudents.
[1] Mandamus - Other Remedy - Appeal. - )Inndamus will not
ordinarily lie to COl'reet nil error in a finnl and appealable
judgllwnt.
[2] Id.-Demand and Refusal.-Although a writ of mandamus may
issue to vaeate a judgment entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction, n motion to vacate stich judgmcnt mu!.'t first be madt'
in the comt that entcred the judgmcnt, and a denial of such
motion must be appealed in the regular manner.
[3] Habeas Corpus-Propriety of Remedy: Petition.-If the facts
justify the remedy of habeas corpus, it is immaterial that petitioner prayed for an inappropriate remedy, sueh liS mandamus;
[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Manflamus, § 19; Am.Jur., MandullIufol,!i flO.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] lIandamuii, § 15(4)"; [2] l\fnnlilllllus.
§ 14; [3] Habeas Corpus, §§ 1, 51; [4] Habeas Corpus, § 3; [,i, 6]
Courts, § 9; [7, 10] Habeas Corpus, ~ 3-t(1); [8J Habeas COl'pu~.
§ 12; [9] Hahc:u! Corpus, § 8; [11] Stntute~, § 111; [12] flal)(,l1~
Corpu!', § 33: [13, H] Hahpu~ ~lIrpu", ~ 3·lI;;); pr" 18] Ct'imilwl
Law, § 141; [16, 17, 19, 23] Criminal Law, § 14-1; [20-22, 2-t-2i]
Criminal Law. § 140; [28J Homicide, § 242; [29] Rabens Corpu,:,
§ 64.
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in such a situation, the petition will be trell.ted as one for a
writ of hahea~ eorpuf;.
[4] ld.-Remedy as Colla.teral Attack.-An attack by haheas ('orpus 011 lIlultiple sentences is a collateral attack on the jnrigllH'nt.
1.5] Courts-Jurisdiction.-"Jurisdiction" is not limited to its conventional meaning of jurisdiction of the cause or the part iI's
when the right to review a decision by It prerogative writ i~
the qu('stion for decision.
[6] ld.-Jurisdiction.-A eomt may have jurisdidion of the cau~e
of action and the parties, but may lack authority or power to
act in the case except in a particular way. 'Under such circulllstances, the court has no jurisdiction to act in any other way.
[7] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.A writ of habeas corpus may issue when the trial court has
sentenced defendant to a term in excess of the maximum provided by law.
[8] ld. - Writ as Substitute for Appeal. - Habeas corpus cannot
serve as a substitute for appeal to review a determination of
fact made on conflicting evidence.
[9] ld.-Grounds for Relief.-A writ of habeas corpus will not lie
to review a decision of a trial court that had discretion to
follow different courf;es of action.
[10] ld.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-A writ of
habeas corpus will is,;ne to review an invalid sentence when.
without redetermination of nny facts, the judgment mny he
corrected to accord with the only pos~ihle determination in
the circumstances.
[11] Statutes-Construction-Law or Fact.-The applicability of tl.
statute to concetled facts is a question of' law.
[12] Ha.beas Corpus - Grounds for Relief - Former Jeopardy.Where the facts are undisputed and the only qnestion as to the
issue of multiple punbhlllent is the llpplicability of Pen. Code.
§ 654, relating to acts made punishable by different proviiiions
of the code, habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review that
issue.
(13) ld. - Grounds for Relief - Judgment or Sentence. - Habeas
corpus is a proper remedy to review the i5sue whether tIll'
Adult Authority has misinterpreted Pen. Code, § (JG4, suh,]' 1.
and is therefore confining petitioner in cxce~s of the time n 1lowed by law. (Pen. Code, § 1487, subd. :2.)

[5] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Courts, ~ 47; Am.Jur., Court~, § 159 d ~('Il.
[10] Illegal or errone<)lJS ~('ntene(' as ground for hahea.; corpus,
note, 76 A.L.R. 468. Sec abo Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpll~, §:19;
Am.Jur., Habeas CorjJu~, § ;i:') ,-t seq.
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[14] Id. - Grounds for Relief - Judgment or Sentence. --- Even if
petitioner is not entiUC'd to hi. illllllt,tlialt' 1'('\('a!'C' from imprisonment, an alleged misinterpretation by th(' .\dult Authol'ity
of the maximum Sl'nit'llcc under whil'h he is ~('r\'ing is reviewable by habeas corpn~, "incl' it wonlll nffN·t th(' Adult
Authority's fixing of the prisoner'" inilt,tinite sentl'llee and
his eligibility for parole.
[15] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Different Offenses in Same
Transa.ction.-PullishlJlent for t\\"o nll"ens('s arising from Ule
same act is prohibited by thl' cons-titutional and cOIIIlJlon-law ;
rule against multiple puni,dllilent for necessarily included I
offenses and by Pen. Code, § 654, proyiding that an act or
omission made punishubJe in differcnt ways by different provisions of thl' code mny he l'llni:-:hahle undl'r ('ither but not
more than one such provision.
[16J Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-WhcI·e an offense cannot he ('ollllllitl,;,1 witlwnt IIt·(·t''':;(\ril~· committing another offense, the latter is a neeegsnrily included offense.
(17] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-.\rson can bc
committed w'ithout nttl'll1pting a muroer, and nn nttempted
murder of a husband hy !'('tting a l!'nsoline fire in the spouse's
bedroom could haye been cOllllnitted without nttempting to
murder his wife.
[18] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Di:lIerent Offenses in Same Transaction.-The proscription of Pen. Code, § 654, against multiple
punishment of a single aet is not limited to necessarily included offenses.
[19] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-If only a single
act is charged as the basis of llIultiple cOllvictions, only one
conviction can be aml'med, notwith~tnlldin~ that the offenses
are not necessarily included offenses. It is the singleness of the
act, not of the oll'eu~(', that is determinative.
[20] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Insofur as only
a single nct is chnrged as the basis for a conviction, defendant
can be punishl'd only once.
[21] Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Pen. Code,
§ 654, relating to ads mude puni:;hable by different provision'!
of the code, may be applied not only wherc there is only (llle
"act" in the ordinnry sense, hut nlso where It course of conduct
violates 1I10l'e than one statute !llld the problem is whether it
comprises a divisible tmnsaction which enn be punished ulllier
more than one statute.
(t2) Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Whether a
course of crimi nul cOllllnct i:i divisible and therefore gives ri~c
to more than one nct within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654,
depends on the intent and oJ.jective of the netor. If all offenses

)
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were incident to one objective, defendant lIlay be punished for
nny one of >,ueh offense~, but not for more than one.
[23] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Where charges
of arson and attempted murdel' were based on defendant's act
of throwing ga~oline into the bedroom of It married couple
:111d igniting it, the arson was the meallS of perpetrating the
crillle of attempted murder, and a cOllviction of both arson
and attempted murder violated Pen. Code, § 654, since the arson
was merely incidental to the primary ohjective of killing the
husband and wife, and defendant could only be punished for
the more serious offell~e, namely, attempted lllurder.
[24] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The purpose of
the protection against multiple punishment for a single act is
to insure that defendant's punishment will be commensurate
with his criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act
of violence with intent to IJ:lrm more than one person or by a
means likely to eause harm to several persons is more culpable
than It defendant who harms only one per~on.
[25} Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Pen. Code,
§ 654, relating to acts made punishable by different provisions
of the code, is not applicable where one act has two results
each of which is an aet of violence against the person of a
separate indi,·idual.
[26] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses .......:.Where ehRrges
of arson and attemptE'd Illurder were hased on defendRnt's act
of throwing gasoline into the bedroom of a hUliband and wife
and igniting it, consecutive sentences for attempted murder
"'ere properly imposed.
[27] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The preclusion,
in Pen. Code, § 654, of multiple prosecution for a single act is
separate and distinct from the preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural
safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related
to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be
precluded even when double punishment is permissible.
[28] Homicide-Punishment-Attempted Murder.-Both the 1949
and the present wording of Pen. Code, § 664, subd. 1, provide
a maximum sentence of 20 years for nttempted murder.
[29] Habeas Corpus-Judgment.-Where defendant was convicted
of both ar~on and nttplllptCtl murd('r as the result of n single
act of throwing gasolin!' into the bedroolll of a married couple
and igniting it, the arwn eouvi(·tioIl, being in exce~5 of the
jurisdiction of the court, was set aside on habeas eorpus and
the Adult Authority dil'ede<1 to I'xelude from its consideration
the purported sentence for al";;on. Defendant was not entitlcd
to. re\ea~e, however, so long ns he was held under valid judgments of cOllviction on the attempted munler charges, and the
writ of habeas corpus was delliI'd.
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PROCEEDING in mandamus to compl'l the California
Adult Authority to fL'i: the time when petitioner may be released 1'1'0111 pri~on. \Vrit (trcatl'u as writ of habeas corpus)
denied.
William H. Abbott, under appointmcnt by the Supreme
Court, fot· Petitioner. Additional briefs were filcd by thp.
Petitioner pro sc.
Stalll("y Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re,;pondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On Junc 4, 1949, petitioner threw gasoline
into the bcdroom of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore R. Raymond and
ignited it. The Raymonds were seyercly burned. Petitioner
was tried and convicted on 1\vo counts of attempted murdcr
and one count of arson, and the trial court ordered that the
sentences for the two counts of attempted murder run consecutively. On appeal the court held that the convictions
were supported by suffieient evidence and that no reversible
error was committed during the trial on the issue of guilt.
Owing to the admission of incompetent evidence on the question of sentencing, however, the cause was remanded for a
redetermination of the question whether the sentence for the
second attempted murder should run consecutively or concurrently. (People v. Neal, 97 Cal.App.2d 668 (218 P.2d
556].) On August 9, 1950, the trial court again ordered that
the two attempted murder sentences run consecutively. No
further appeal was taken.
Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandamus to order the
Adult Authority to fix the time when he may be released
from prison. He contends that subdivision 1 of Peual Cdile,
section 664, provides a maximum sentence of 10 years for
attempted murder and that his convictions on a second count
of attemptcd murder and on a count of arson were invalid on
the ground that thcy puni,;hed him three timrs for a single
act in violation of Pcnal Code, section 654.
Before we rcach the merits of petitioner's contcntions we
must first determille whether they can be rai~ed, now that the
judgment of eonvi"tion has hecome final.
[1 J MalHlamus will not ortlinarily lie to corred an error
in a final and appralable jn(lgmrnt. (0 'N cill v. Reynolds,
116 Cal. 264, 266 [48 P. 57] ; Andrews v. Poll:ce Court, 21
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Ca1.2d 479,480 [133 P.2J. 3D8, 145 A.L.R. 1042].) (2] .\1though a writ of mandamus lIlay issue to vacate a jn(l;;plH'llt
entered by a court that lackc(1 jurisdiction, a motion to Yltcate
smh judgment must fir:;t oe made in thc court that rnten'(l
the judgment, allli a tlrllial of such motion mu:;t be appeale(l
in the regular manner. (Alldrews v. Superior Court, 29
Ca1.2d 208,214 [174 P.2,l 313J ; see Phclan v. Supcrior Court,
35 Ca1.2d 363,372 [217 P.2d 951J.)
[3] The proper remedy, if any, is llabeas corpus. If the
facts justify this remedy it is immaterial that·petitioner had
prayed for an inappropriate one. (OWCllS v. Superior Court,
52 Ca1.2d 822, 827 (345 P.2d 921J ; see 3 Witkin, California
Procedure, pp. 2568-2569.) Accordingly, we treat this petition
as one for a writ of habeas corpus.
[ 4] The petitioner's attack on the multiple sentences is a
collateral attack on the judgment. Subdivision 1 of Pcnal
Code, section 1487, limits the review of erroneous judgments
by habeas corpus to cases in which the conviction and sentence
imposed were in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. The
crucial question, therefore, is "'11cther the court acts in excess
of its jurisdiction by imposing multiple sentences contrary to
Penal Code, section 654.
[5] The word jurisdiction is not limited to its conventional meaning of jurisdiction of the cause or the parties when
the right to review a decision by a prerogative writ is the
question for decision. (Fortellbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.
2d 405, 407 [106 P.2d 4111; see In re BelT. 19 Cal.2d 488, 494
[122 P.2d 22}.) [6] "A court may have jurisdiction of
the cause of action and of the parties, but it may lack the
authority or power to act in the case except in a particular way.
Under such circumstanres, it is now generally held that the
court had 110 jurisdiction." (Fortcllbury v. H11perior C01lrt,
wpra, at pp. 407-408.) [7] Thus, the writ of habeas corpus
has issued when the defendant was erroneously sentenced to
an indeterminate rather than a fixed term (In 1'e Lee, 177 Cal.
690,694 [171 P. 958]), and we have statrd that the writ li("'s
\\'hen the trial court has sentelwed a nrfendant to a term ill
rX"rss of the maximum provided hy law. (See In rc McInturff,
~7 Cal.2d 876, 880 [236 P.2d 574] ; 111 1'C Morck, 180 Cal. 384
(181 P. 657].)
[8] Habeas corpus, however, r8nnot Sf"l"ve as It snbstitntp
for appeal to review a netermination of fac't made on conflicting evidence. (In re Dixon, 41 C'a12tl 7;)6, 760 f264 P.2(1
513J ; 111 re McInturff, 37 Ca1.2d 876, RSO [236 P.2d 574] ; In rl'
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Lindley,29 Ca1.2d 709,722 [177 P.2d 918] ; In re Connor, 16
Ca1.2d 701, 705-706 p08 1'.2d 10].) [9] Nor will thc writ

/)

/
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lie to review a decision of a trial court that bad discretion to
follow different eourSl'S of action. [10] The writ will issue,
however, to review an invalid sentence, when, without the redetermination of any faets, the judgment may be corrected to
-"accord with the only other possible determination ill the circumstances." (I'll l'C McIllturff. SlIpra, at p. 881.)
The attorney general contends, however, that thc question
whether a person has been made to suffer double punishment
for a single act is a question of fact and therefore habeas
corpus will not lie. He invokes 1/1 I'C Chapman, 43 CaI.2d 385,
390 [273 P.2d 817] where the court stated: "Whether the
evidence accepted by the trier of faet shows petitioner guilty
of one crime or of two is in part a fadual question. 'It is, of
course, an established rule that habeas corpus may not be
used instead of an appeal to l'eyiew determinations of fact
made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial. [Citations.l
Likewise, the writ is not available to correct errors or irregularities relating to ascertainment of the faets wllcn such errorR
could and should haye been raised by appeal. [Citations.]'"
On the record herein we are not required to' review determinations of fact made upon conflicting eyidenee or to correct
errors or it'regulariti('s relating to ascertainment of the facts.
The return to the order to show eause does not take issue with
petitioner's statt'ment of facts. The recital of facts by both
parties, apparently tllkt'n from the statement of facts in People
v. Neal, 97 Cal.App.2d 668, 669-672 [218 P.2d 556], discloses
only a single course of criminnl condllet illYolving the com·
mission of three offenses. motivated by petitioner's determination to kill Mr. and Mrs. Raymond because he believed 1\[1'.
Raymond had alil'nnted the affections of his wife. Our own
t'xamillation of the trial transpript disdoses nothing to the contrary. Unlike In rc Chapman, slIll/'a, this is not a case, th('1'pfore, where the court in proc('l'ding to punish for aU threl~
convictions could be said to have rested its dp.tp.rmination UP0!l
conflicting evidence. [11] The applirability of a stat1lte
to eonceded facts is a qUl'stion of law. (Nrl.~oll v. :nlollfgomrry
Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 376 [61 S.Ct. 593, 85 L.Ed. Sfl71 ;
E.qtate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 4:)3, 456 [1;'9 P.2d 6301.)
[12] Sin!'(' the facts in til" instant ea<;e arc un<1isplI\t'(1
and the only qU('!o;tioll as to thC' i",.:ur of multi pIc puni"hmrllt
is the applieahility of Pl'lJal CodC'. sl'etion 654, habeas corpm;
is a proper remedy to revi('w that issue.
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[13] Habeas corpus is also a proper remedy to review
the issue whether the Adult Authority has misinterpreted
subdivision 1 of Penal Code, section 664, and is thercforc confining pctitioner in excess of the time allowed by law. (Pen.
Code, § 1487, subd.2.) [14] Even if the petitioner is 110t
entitled to his immediate release, an allegcd misinterpretation
by the Adult Authority of the maximulU sentence Wider which
a prisoner is serving is redewable by habeas corpus, since it
wouId affect the Adult Authority's fixing of the prisoner's
indefinite sentence and his eligibility for parole. (See In re
Chapmatl,43 Ca1.2d 385, 387 [273 r,2d 8171; People v. Keko.e,
33 Cal.2d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 321J ; People v. Craig, 17 CaUd
453,458-459 [110 P.2d 403].)
'Ve therefore reach the merits. Petitioner's conviction of
oue count of arson and two counts of attempted murder rests
upon defendant's act of throwing gasoline into the bedroom of
1\11'. and Mrs. Raymond and igniting it. [15] Punishment
for two offenses arising from the same act is prohibited by the
constitutional and common-law rule against mUltiple punishment for necessarily included offenses (People v. Kelloe, 33
Cal.2d 711, 713 [204 P.2d 321]) and by Penal Code, section
654, which provides that "An act or omission ,vmch is made
punishable in diffcrent ways by different provisions of this
code may be puuishable under either of such provisions, but
in no case can it be punished under more than one."l
None of Neal's convictions is for a necessarily included offense. [ 16] "[W] here an offense cannot be committed
without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is
a necessarily included offense." People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d
589, 596 [184 P.2d 512].) [17] Arson can be committed
without attempting a murder, and the attempted murder of
Mr. Raymond could have been committed without attempting
to murder Mrs. Raymond.
[18] The proscription of section 654 against multiple
punishment of a single act, however, is not limited to necessarily included offenses. (People v, Loga11, 41 Cal.2d 279, 290
[260 P.2d 20] ; People v. Knowles. 35 CaJ.2d 175, 187 [217
P.2d 1] ; People v. Kyncitc, 15 CaJ.2d 73], 761-762 r104 r.2d
'Although section 654 docs not expressly preclude douhle punishment
wIlen an act gives rise to more than on(' \'iolntion of the BRllle Ptmal Code
sedion or to multiple violntioll~ of th/? criminnl provi~ion8 of other codes,
it is settled tbat the hnllie prillt'ipic it I'llun!'iates precludes double punisb,
ment in sucb cnses nl~o. (Pl'opi,' v. Broll'n,4!1 ('nJ.2d ;'77, :';91 [320 P.2d
:;1; see People v. Robl'rt.~, 40 CnJ.2d 4S3, 4!11 [2:;4 P.2d ;jOl]; People v.
Clefllett, 208 Cal. 142, 144 [280 P. 681]; I'roplo v. Nor Wooa., 37 Cal.2d
584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].)

Dec. 1960]

NEAL V. STATE OF CAIJIFORNIA
£55 C.2d 11: 9 Ca1.Rptr. 607. 357 P2d 839]

19

794] ; accord: People v. Repola, 280 App.Div. 735, 281 App.
Diy. 679 [117 N.Y.S.:!d :!sa, 288], aflil'll1t'tl 303 XY. 740
[113 N.E.2il 421] ; l'evple Y. S(wansc, 1 Misc.2tl 305 [114
N.Y.S.2d 816, S3G-S3H 1; SN' l'eoplc v. SlIyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 83
[148 N.B. 7!JG] lillt('I'lll'etill~ N.Y. P~>n. Code, § 1938, whieh
is identical with CaL Pcn. Code, § 654].) In People Y. Knowles
35 Cal.2d 173, 187 [217 P .2d 1], we stated: "If a COurse of
criminal conduct causes the commission of more than onp.
offense, each of which Call be committed without committing
any other, the applicability of section 654 will depend upon
whether a separate and distinct act can be established as the
basis of each conviction, or whether a single act has been so
comrilitted that more than olle statute has been violated.
[19] If only a single act is charged as the basis of the
multiple convictions, only one cOllviction can be affirmed, notwithstanding that the offenses are not necessarily included
offenses. It is the singleness of the act and not of the offense
that is determinative." Thus the act of placing a bomb into
an automobile to kill the oWllrr may form the basis for a con·
viction of attempted murder, 01' a.'!Sault with intent to kill, or
malicious use of explosiyes. [20] Insofar as only a single
act is charged as the basis for the cOllviction, however, the
defendant can be puuished only once. (People v. Kynette, 15
Cal.2d 731, 762 [104 P.2d 7941.) Likewise, the act of using
an instrument to cause an abortion which results in death
can be punished for abortion or for murder in the second
degree but not for bot11. (People v. Brow?!, 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590·
594 [320 P.2d 5].)
Few if any crimes, however, are the result of a single
physical act. [21] c, Section 654 has been applied not only
where there was but one 'act' in the ordinary sense ••. but
also where a course of. conduct violated more than one statute
and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible trans·
action which could be punished under more than one statute
within the meaning of s(>ction 654." (People v. Brown, supra,
591.)
[22] Whether a course of criminal conduct is diyisibln
and therefore I?ives rise to more than one act within the m(>an·
ing of srction 654 drpends on the intent and objective of the
actor. If all of the ofTrll.;;rs were inrid<'nt to one objective, the
defendant may be puni<::llPd for anyone of such offenses hut
not for more than one.
Thus in Proplc v. IO(Jan,41 Cal.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 201,
defendant, w110 chose to commit robbery by first knocking out
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his victim wit.h a baseball bat and then taking his valuables was
f!onvictcd of both robbcr'y and assault. \V C rcYcl'sc<1 the assault
cOllviction 011 the ground that the double puuishment violated
section 654. In In rc Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385, 387 [273 P.2d
817], however, we held that when the assault is not a means of
perpetrating the robbery but is an act that follows after tIll'
robbery is completed the defendant is guilty of two punishable
acts. Likewise in People v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 600 l184
P.2d 512], statutory rape and lewd and lasciyious conduct
were held to be one act since both offenses arose from a single
act of sexual intercourse. In People v. Slobodian, 31 Ca1.2d
555, 561-563 [191 P .2d 1], however, we sustained convictions
for sex perversion and lewd and lascivious conduct, even
though both aeis were closely connected in time and a part
of the same criminal venture since the act giving risc to the
lewd and lascivious conduct was separate and distinct and
was not incidental to or the means by which the act of sex
perversion was accomplished.
[23] In the instant case the arson was the means of perpetrating the crime of attempted murder just as the malicious
use of explosives was the means for perpetrating .the attempted
murder in People v. Kynette, and the assault with the baseball
bat was the means of committing robbery ill People v. Logan.
The conviction for both arson and attempted murder violated
Penal Code, section 654, since the arson was merely incidental
to the primary objective of killing Mr. and Mrs. Raymond.
Petitioner, therefore, can only be punished for the more
serious offense, which is attempted murder.
The two attempted murder convictions, however, present
a different problem. [24] The purpose of the protection
against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant's
punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability.
A. defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent
to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause
harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant
who harms only one pE'rson. For example, a defendant who
chooses a means of murder that places a planeload of passengers in danger, or results in injury to many persons, is properly subject to greater punishment than a defendant who
chooses a means that harms only a single person. This rlistinction between an act of violence against the person that
violates more than one statute and such an art that harms
more than one person is well settled. [25] Scction 654 is
not" ... applicable where ... one act has two results each of
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which is an act of violcll(,(' Hg-ainst the pl'rsOIl of a separate
individual." (People v. Brllnlloll. 70 Cal.App. 223. 235-236
[233 P. 88] ; sce also People \-. Jlajor. 65 Cal. 138. 146 [:3
P. 597,52 Am.Rcp. 295] ; People v. Gaither. ]73 Cal.App.2d
662,668 [343 P.2d 799] ; Peoplc v. Holmall. 72 Cal.App.2d 75,
100 [164 P.2d 297].) Thus, in Peoplc Y. J(n()!cl('.~, supra, 35
Ca1.2d 175, 187, the def(>ndants lddnaped t\\'o persons for the
purpose of robbing thcm. The robbery cOllvictions were reversed by reason of Penal Code, section 654, but both kidnaping convictions were affirmed.
[26] The two consecutive attempted murder convictions
were therefore prop(>rly impos(>d. Since pel itioner was tried
for both crimes at the same time we do not decidewhethpr
section 654 ref[uircs all of the prost'l'utions to be bronght at the
same time. [27] St'<'tion 6:54 's predusion of multiplc
prosecution is separate and distinct from its preclusion of multiple punishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is
a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related to the punishmt'ut to be imposed; double prosecution may be precluded even when double punishment is permissible.
[28] Petitioner's contention that subdivision 1 of Penal
Code, section 664, provides for a maximum sentence of 10 years
for attempted murder is without merit. Both the 1949 and
present wording of the section provide a maximum sentence
of 20 years for the crime of attempted murder.
[29] The arson conviction, being in PKcess of the jurisdiction of the court, is set aside, and the Adult Authority is
directed to exclucle from its con1';idrration the purported sentence for arson. Petitioner, howevpr, is not rntitled to release
so long as he is held nnder valid jn(l~mrnts of conviction for
his other crimes. The order to show cause is, therefore, discharged and the writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion review of the
question whether a prisoner is being punished under more than
one penal statute for one "aet" within the meaning of Pcnal
Code, section 654, presrllts n prohlp1I1 of the sufficiency of the
evidence to show that the course of (·"iminal conduct whil'h
resulted in multiple' s('nt(,l1<'es was a divisible transaction.
(See the treatment of the f[llcslion in sueh cases as People v.
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Greer (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 589, 604 [184 P.2d 512] ; People Y.
Slobodion (1948),31 Ca1.2d 555,562-563 [191 P.2d 1] ; People
v. Knowles (1950), 35 Cal.2d 175, 188 [13b] [217 P.2d 1] ;
People v. Kehoe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 711, 714-715 [204 P.2d
321] ; People v. Logan (1953), 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [11] [260
P.2d 20]; People v. Brown (1958), 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590-591
[13] [320 P.2d 5]; cf. People v. Hoyt (1942),20 Ca1.2d 306,
316-317 [8] [125 P.2d 29].)
Although the majority say (ante, p. 17) that they do
not review a question of fa<-t but· determine .<Hily a question
of law-the application of a statute to uncontradicted factsactually they review and strike down a factual determination
which rested upon evidence that supports the contrary inferences on which the trial court based its final judgments. The
majority in effect recognize that their redetermination necessarily involves a review of the sufficiency of the evidence by
the manner in which they state the general test whereby they
would solve the problem. They say (ante, p. 19) that
"Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of
section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.
If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for anyone of such offenses but not
for more than one." 'Vhether the criminal's intent is directed
toward one principal" objective" and whether his oth('r crimes
are merely" incident" to that objective, under the majority's
view, would be questions for initial decision by the trial court,
for review on appeal, and again (""h('ther or not the questions
were raised at the trial Or on appeal) for review on hab('as
corpus by every court (in felony cases the superior court, the
District Court of Appeal and this court) which has jurisdiction. But such review by habeas corpus obviously could not be
carried out in an informed fashion except by appraising the
evidence which was presented at the trial or perhaps (the
majority suggest no limitation in this regard) by taking evidence additional to that received at the trial.
It requires no extensive evidential statement to demonstrate
that the issue which the majority here resolve is in essence
factual and that in effect the majority have retried the case
insofar as the arson count is con('('rned. The defendant was
charg('d with and convicted of two crimes against persons
(attempted murders) and 01H' (·rime ag-aillst property (arson).
As pertinent herE', murdl'r is /lpfilled b.v PPllal Co<1(', section
187 ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with
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malice aforethought") awl sedioll 189 (" All murder which
is perpetrated by . . . wilful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate al'son, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any
act punishable unuer Section 288, is murder of the first degree .... ") \Italic~ aUIled). Attempted murder is made PUllishable by subdivision 1 of section 664 of the Penal Code, and
by legal defiuition attempted murder is the doing of a direct,
ineffectual act toward consummation of the intended murder.
(See People v. Snyder (1940),15 Ca1.2d 706, 708 [1] [104 P.
2d 639] ; People v. Camodcea (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 142, 145 [lJ
[338 P.2d 903].) Arsoll, as pertinent here, is defined by section 447a of the Penal Code ("Any person who wilfully and
maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned ... any
dwelling house ... shall be guilty of arSOll .. , ."). Here the defendant intended to, and-did, accomplish the crime of arson,
and he also intended and attempted, but failed, to accomplish,
two killings in the perpetration of arson. Obviously the crime
of attempted murder is of a class separate from the crime of
arson and each class involves proof of one or more factual elements not common to the other. The three convictions were reviewed on appeal (People v. Neal (1950), 97 Cal.App.2d 668
[218 P.2d 556) and the reviewing court considered and commented not only on evidence tending to establish the crimes
against the persons of the victims of attempted murder, particularly the evidence of "specific intent to murder Mr. and
Mrs. Raymond" (p. 672 [2,3] of 97 Cal.App.2d) but also on
the evidence ,vhich tended to show that defendant wilfully and
maliciously burned the house in which they dwelt (p. 670 [1]
of 97 Cal.App.2d) and "had an inclination to pyromania"
(p. 673 [5] of 97 Cal.App.2d). In these circumstances I
cannot agree with the majority that the criminal who deliberately chose to commit both arson and murder by the same
incendiary course of conduct necessarily and as a matter of
law committed but one" act ... which is made punishable in
different ways by different provisions of this code" (Pen.
Code, § 654).
The subject use of habeas corpus is squarely contrary to
the following rules: "[IIJ abeas corpus may not be used instead of an appeal to review determinations of fact made upon
conflicting evidence after a fair tria1. [Citations.] Likewise,
the writ is not available to correct errors or irregularities
relating to ascertainment of the facts when such errors could
. and should have been raised by appeal. [Citations.]" (In r.

)
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Dixon (1953). 41 Ca1.2d 7£;6,760 [6,7] [264 P.2U 513].) In
the case of III rc Chapman (1954), 43 Ca1.2d 385, 3VO [9, 10]
[273 P.2d 817], although we passed 011 and rdected the 1l1et"its
of a prisoner's contention, raised on llabeas corpus, that his
course of criminal conduct could be punished only Ollce, we
also pointed out that "Whether the evidcnce acccpted by thl'
trier of fact shows petitioner guilty of olle crime 01' of two [or
of a course of criminal conduct which, although it constitutes
two separately defined crimes, can be punished but onee by
reason of section 654] is in part a factual question," and we
quoted and relied on the foregoing rules statf.!d in the Dixon
case as an alternate ground for denying the ,vrit.
While I have approved of and participated in decisions of
this court which have somewhat broadened the uses of habeas
corpus, employment of the writ to review or initially decide
'luestions of the intent and objective of the criminal actOl"
seems to me to be a radical departure which goes far beyond
the scope of the writ as previously extended. (See In re McInturff (1951),37 Cal.2d 876,880 [3] [236 P.2d 574].) Many
California prison('rs are serving multiple final sentences for
offenses variously connected in their commission; snch prisoners will, of course, be encouraged by today's decision to flood
this court, or lower courts, with applications for similar evidential reviews. I think it unsound and highly undesirable
to now permit-indeed, require--the courts to go behind these
final judgments and open or reopen the often difficult and in
large part factual questions attendant upon the application
of section 654.
The problems inherent in the majority's action will become
particularly complex if the courts are to continue to assume
to review on habeas corpus the sufficiency of the evidence to
support separate sentences for the crimes which arc enumerated in Penal Code, section 189, as a part of the definition
of murder of the first degree l and for murders or attempted
murders factually connected with such felonies. It has been
routine procedure in such cases to sentence defendants both
for murder and for the othcr felony named in section 189.
{E.g., People v. Chavez (1958),50 Ca1.2d 778, 782-783 [arson]
[329 P.2d 907] ; People v. Riley (1950), 35 Ca1.2d 279, 280
[robbery] [217 P.2d 625] ; People v. Simeone (1945),26 Ca1.2rl
II, All murder which ill ••• eommitted in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate arson. rape. robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act puniab·
able under Seetion 288, is murder of the first degree.••• " (Pen. Code.
t 189.)
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795, 797 [robbery] [161 P.2d 369] ; People v. Kelso (1945),
25 Ca1.2d 848, 849 [burglary] [155 P.2d 819] ; People v. Hill
(1943),22 Ca1.2d 863, 864 [rohbery] [141 P.2d 418] ; People
v. Ki'TIg (1939), 13 Ca1.2d 521, 522-523 [robbery] [90 P.2d
291].) And in what appears to be the only case ill which the
question was particularly discussed, it was held that such sentences (for robbery and murder in the perpetration of the
robbery) did not contravene section 654. (People v. Hoyt
(1942), supra, 20 Ca1.2d 306, 316-317 [8].) Are the courts
now to reexamine the eases of prisoners serving final sentences
of imprisonment for both murder and a related robbery and
to determine whether a defendant set out to rob and inei~
dentally killed or set out to kill and incidentally robbed (in
either of which events, under the majority's holding, he could
be sentenced at most for murder), or whether pel'ehance he set
out to commit both robbery and murder and exeeuted both of
his intents as part of the same transaction by divisible acts T
As another example of diffieulties with which the courts will
nmv be confronted (if today's majority deeision is consistently
applied), reference may bc made to prisoners who are confined
under multiple sentences for forgeries and use of false writiugs
in closely related transactions. Where such mnltiple convietions (in one class of crime or another) have been sustained
(see In re Horowitz (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 534,541-545 [4] [203
P.2d 5131 ; People v. Cline (1947), 79 Cal.App.2d 11, 19 [4]
[179 P.2d 89]) or have never been questioned, as is doubtless
true in hundreds of easC's, can thC'se prisoners now obtain rC'view by habeas eorpus to decide the question whether their
offenses ean be puuished but oncc bE'cause thcy had but one
objectiveT
Furthermore, it does not appear that the majority furnish
a satisfactory tE'st to be applied by sentencing eourts. 2 Under
the majority view, for example, a defendant who chooses to
fire one shot as a m(>a11S of murdering A, sllcc(>edl". only in
terrifying A, but in('i(l('ntally kills bystandf'r B, would apparently be punishahle both for thf' murdf'r of B anel the assault
on A (a violntion of two l".tntutes b~' one act). (See antf'. pp.
20-21: PM117c Y. Brannon (1924), 70 Ca1.App. 225. 23:; f51
[233 P. 88].) Bnt a dl'f(,ll<1nnt W110 ehoo!;!'!; arson of B's build-:In tbis regnrd my conecm is with {utur!' application of the majority
opinion by trilll courts; at this writing it would seem imprnrtieal if not
impossible to formulnte n ~ingle, general test which would ('ncompaSB o.J1
the previous, ineonsistent appellate derisions concerning mUltiple punish·
ment under section 654.
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iug, occupieu by A, as a means of both murdering A and injuring B by destroying his property, amI who succceds in destroying the building but not in killing A., would be punishable
at most for attempted murder of A. because he committed only
the one act of setting fire to a bUilding. This does 110t appear
to be "punishment •.. commensurate with his criminal liability" (ante, p. 20), one of the theoretical bases apparently
relied on by the majority both to permit punishment for two
offenses in the first instance and for only one offense in the
second instance.
My principal concern, however, as already indirated is the
misuse of habeas corpus to strike down the final judgment of
conviction of arson on the ground (allte, p. 21) tlIat it is "in
excess of the jurisdiction of the [trial] court" bccause of its
factual connection with the attempted murders. For the reasons above stated I cannot join in the opinion or the judgment
and would, instead, simply discharge the order to show cause
and deny any relief to the petitioner, whether his application
be treated as one seeking habeas corpus, mandate, or some other
undesignated remedy.
McComb, J., concurred.
The applications of petitioner and of respondent for a rehearing were denied January 10, 1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the applications should be
granted.

